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Death by a Thousand Cuts or Hard Bargaining?: How the
Court‘s Indecision in Wilkie v. Robbins Improperly
Eviscerates the Bivens Action
I. INTRODUCTION
One June day in Wyoming, Frank Robbins received a phone call
from agents of the federal government demanding an easement on his
land. Robbins knew nothing of this easement because the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) agents neglected to record the easement when they
purchased it from Robbins‘s predecessor.1 For several years, BLM agents
mounted a campaign to harass and intimidate Robbins through increasing
their supervision of his land infractions, not allowing him to cross federal
land, videotaping guests at his ranch, and breaking into his ranch.2 The
BLM actions were intended to intimidate and coerce Robbins into giving
the federal government the public easement. Thirteen years after the
initial contact between federal agents and a rancher, the case reached the
United States Supreme Court. Robbins lost his final claim against the
federal agents as the Court held that no judicial remedy was available for
the injury that Robbins suffered at the hands of the BLM agents.3
In one of the most influential opinions in American jurisprudence,
Chief Justice Marshall declared the infamous statement, ―The very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.‖ 4
This line of reasoning inspired the monumental decision in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,5 where the
Supreme Court created a cause of action for a citizen when a federal
officer violated his constitutional rights.6 Bivens was a judicially created
right of action against federal officers for violations of federal
constitutional rights. Because the cause of action against federal officers

1. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2593 (2007).
2. Id. at 2593–95.
3. Id. at 2604–05.
4. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
5. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
6. It has also inspired Bivens‘s counterpart—the statutory formulation creating causes of
actions against state actors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2008). Shortly after the Civil War, Congress
enacted a reconstruction statute, § 1983, that expressly authorized suits for violation by state officers
of federal constitutional rights.
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is not related to a specific constitutional provision, Bivens remedies have
been controversial.7 Bivens was decided in 1971, and in the past thirty
years, this area of law has undergone major retrenchment. Robbins‘s
claim fell under Bivens jurisprudence as Robbins sought damages for the
violation of his constitutional rights by the BLM agents. The Court used
this case to further limit the ability of courts to grant a Bivens remedy
against federal agents.
The ideal maxim expounded in Marbury v. Madison—that for every
right there is a remedy—is far from true in practical applications of
modern litigation. Due to immunity doctrines, many injured individuals
are left without a remedy when the government is the defendant in the
suit.8 Moreover, the complex doctrine of justiciability provides another
bar to receiving remedies when rights have been violated.9 The
curtailment of the availability of a Bivens cause of action is another
example in the modern legal system where an individual injured by a
federal officer has no remedy. It is unclear, however, why federal
officers should be excluded from paying damages if they violate an
individual‘s constitutional rights. State actors, for example, are still
required under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to pay damages if they violate federal
constitutional rights. Because Bivens causes of actions were created by
federal common law instead of a statutorily defined structure akin to
§ 1983, Bivens causes of actions have hardly been embraced.
With the most recent decision in Wilkie v. Robbins,10 not much of the
original jurisprudence established in Bivens remains. Wilkie continues
the trend of substantially retreating from the original Bivens action. By
failing to provide a Bivens remedy when the Court conceded that no
other adequate remedy existed, and by expanding the policy arguments
for ―special factors counseling hesitation,‖11 the Wilkie decision not only
prevents the extension of the Bivens remedy, but effectively limits prior
cases where the remedy has been granted to their facts.12 The Court‘s
7. See Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 289, 326–28 (1995) (arguing that constitutional rights have come to be vindicated on their own
terms). See also Jeffrey M. Nye, Holly v. Scott: Constitutional Liability of Private Correctional
Employees and the Future of Bivens Jurisprudence, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1245, 1270 (2007) (―The
Bivens remedy is the sole vehicle through which many constitutional violations may be redressed—
no statute, for example, imposes liability on individuals who violate a person‘s Fourth Amendment
rights.‖).
8. See generally Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706 (1999) (standing for the general proposition of state sovereign immunity).
9. See generally Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555 (1992) (standing for the proposition that where plaintiffs lack standing, their case cannot be
adjudicated even if a wrong has occurred and has not been remedied).
10. 127 S. Ct. 2588 (2007).
11. See infra Part II.
12. Id.
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retrenchment of the availability of the Bivens remedy reinforces the idea
that as a practical matter not every right has a remedy. The Court avoids
deciding whether the alternative remedies are adequate to preclude the
Bivens actions. The Court also avoids deciding whether the BLM agents
violated Robbins‘s constitutional rights through the series of threats and
intimidation levied against him. The majority weighs the BLM actions as
―death by a thousand cuts‖13 at one point and ―hard bargaining‖14 at
another, and then assumes that the intimidation was not severe enough to
warrant a remedy. Finally, the Court pronounces that Congress should
decide whether there should be a remedy for intimidation by federal
officers.15 By avoiding the pivotal decision of whether a right was
actually violated, the Court changes the analysis to focus on factors that
allow the limitation of the Bivens remedy in almost any circumstance.
This note begins with a brief discussion of the principal issues
discussed in Bivens and then traces the development of the two
exceptions to the Bivens action that have swallowed the rule. Part III
discusses the facts, holding, and dissent of Wilkie v. Robbins. Part IV
argues that the Wilkie decision broadly denies the enforcement of a
constitutional right and improperly eviscerates the Bivens remedy in four
ways. First, the Court departs from the most important consideration in
determining whether a Bivens remedy applies, which is deciding whether
an alternative remedy exists. Second, the Court adopts an unnecessarily
broad interpretation of special factors counseling hesitation to include
concern over opening the floodgates to litigation and the difficulty of
deciding whether a right was violated that precludes a Bivens remedy.
Third, the Court improperly declines to decide whether a constitutional
right was in fact violated before deciding how the severity of the
violation of the right affects the plaintiff‘s receipt of damages. Fourth,
the Court improperly bases its denial of the Bivens remedy on concerns
about legislating, but in doing so, reveals the legislative nature of the
Bivens remedy itself as being a matter of federal common law. This note
concludes by discussing the future of the availability of the Bivens
remedy.

13. Id. at 2600 (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 40, Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588,
No. 06-219 (Feb. 20, 2007).
14. Id. at 2600.
15. Id. at 2604–05.
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II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court created a private right of action against federal
officers in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents.16 Bivens alleged that
his arrest by federal officers without a warrant and without probable
cause was a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Charges against
Bivens were dropped, and Bivens sued the officers who had arrested
him.17 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court‘s dismissal of the
case and held that when a constitutional right has been violated, federal
courts will supply all customary remedies for the invasion if there are no
special factors counseling hesitation or if Congress has explicitly
provided another remedy that is equally effective.18 At the beginning of
this judicially created cause of action, the Court established important
exceptions to obtaining a remedy for the violation of a constitutional
right. In addition, the Court considered only the Fourth Amendment in
this case and left other constitutional violations and implied remedies for
another day.19
Perhaps Justice Harlan‘s concurrence in Bivens has had a longerlasting impact on the Bivens jurisprudence than the majority opinion.
Instead of accepting hard-and-fast rules, Justice Harlan saw the issues
presented by remedying constitutional wrongs as more of a legislative
matter. He encouraged a sort of balancing test that looks at factors
contributing to the vindication of the right and factors determining the
proper remedy for this right.20 He wrote the famous mantra of Bivens
actions: ―For people in Bivens‘ shoes, it is damages or nothing.‖21 The
lack of alternate remedies seemed to be one of the most important factors
for Justice Harlan in the need for a remedy against these federal officers.
Eight years after the Bivens decision, the Bivens remedy was applied
in two expansive cases. In Davis v. Passman,22 the plaintiff, a
congressional staffer, claimed that she had been a victim of sexual
discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment.23 Congress had
expressly exempted its own staff from the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
she could not obtain relief under the general federal statute.24 The Court
held that a cause of action could be directly implied from the Due
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Id. at 389.
Id. at 396.
Id.
Id. at 408–10.
Id. at 410.
442 U.S. 228 (1979).
Id. at 230–31.
Id. at 247 n.26.
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Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Brennan, who authored
the opinion, explained that if the plaintiff had sued under a statute, then
her cause of action would depend on congressional intent to create such a
cause of action. Because the statute did not apply to her, she sued under
the Constitution, and the decision to imply a private right from the
Constitution fell to the Supreme Court.25 Justice Brennan reasoned that
because she had no other way to enforce her constitutional right to be
free from gender discrimination, she must be able to seek relief under the
Fifth Amendment.26
A year later, the Supreme Court again extended the Bivens action to
cover the violation of an Eighth Amendment constitutional right. In
Carlson v. Green,27 a mother sued on behalf of her deceased son‘s estate,
alleging that her son had died because the federal officers had not given
him adequate care.28 The Court reasoned that neither of the two factors
necessary to refuse a Bivens action existed in the case. The Court found
that there were no special factors that counseled hesitation in applying
the Bivens action, but did not expand on what these factors could be.29 In
addition, the Court found that even though the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) provided remedies for certain intentional torts of a federal
officer, Congress had not explicitly declared the FTCA to be a substitute
for a Bivens action.30 The Court reasoned that the Bivens action was more
effective than the FTCA remedy and a better deterrent against
constitutional violations.31 Even though the Court did grant a Bivens
action, the Court specifically provided that a Bivens action would be
precluded if there were any special factors that counseled hesitation.32
The Court began to restrict the availability of the Bivens action in
1983 by using the ―special factors counseling hesitation‖ exception
established in Bivens and reaffirmed in Carlson. In Chappell v. Wallace,
the Court declined to apply a Bivens action because of special factors
counseling hesitation.33 In Chappell, five enlisted men in the U.S. Navy
sued their superiors for violating their constitutional right to be free from
racial discrimination.34 The plaintiffs alleged that because of racial
discrimination, they were assigned to unappealing duties, suffered threats
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 241–42.
Id.
446 U.S. 14 (1980).
Id. at 16.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 18–19.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 18.
462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983).
Id. at 297.
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from superior officers, received harsh punishments, and received low
performance evaluations.35 The Court unanimously found that the nature
and structure of the military system as a whole was a special factor
counseling hesitation that would preclude a Bivens remedy. Justice
Burger wrote for the Court: ―Civilian courts must, at the very least,
hesitate long before entering a suit which asks the court to tamper with
the established relationship between enlisted military personnel and their
superior officers; that relationship is at the heart of the necessarily unique
structure of the military establishment.‖36 The Court did not address the
adequacy of the remedies the plaintiff could receive in the military
structure, but focused more on the plenary authority of Congress to
provide for military discipline and review of military matters.37
In Bush v. Lucas,38 decided on the same day as Chappell v. Wallace,
the Court declined to extend a Bivens action to a claim under the First
Amendment when a federal employee claimed he had been demoted
because he exercised his First Amendment rights. The Court reaffirmed
its ability to award monetary damages for a violation of a constitutional
right, but also found that this power was limited by policy
considerations. The Court explained the law regarding Bivens actions:
When Congress provides an alternative remedy, it may . . . indicate its
intent, by statutory language, by clear legislative history, or . . . by the
statutory remedy itself, that the Court‘s power should not be exercised.
In the absence of such a congressional directive, the federal courts must
make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate . . . paying
particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling [sic]
39
hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.

The Court took a larger step in restricting the Bivens remedy by
broadening the policies that could be considered as special factors
counseling hesitation. The Court found that Congress had expertise in the
field of civil service policy and had fashioned appropriate civil service
remedies for constitutional violations.40 Although those remedies were
not as effective as Bivens remedies, the Court did not desire to intrude
upon Congress‘s prescribed, meaningful review program.41 The Court

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 302–03.
462 U.S. 367 (1983).
Id. at 378.
Id. at 388–89.
See id. at 378 n.14.
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said that Congress could ―indicate its intent [to preclude Bivens actions]
by statutory language, by clear legislative history, or perhaps even by the
statutory remedy itself . . . .‖42 Congress‘s expertise in making policy for
hiring and firing constituted a special factor counseling hesitation.
A significant retrenchment in courts‘ application of the Bivens action
using special factors counseling hesitation came again in Schweiker v.
Chilicky.43 In Chilicky, the Social Security Administration erroneously
discontinued benefits to thousands of people before Congress stopped the
administration‘s disqualifications of benefits.44 Several individuals who
were wrongfully denied benefits experienced severe financial hardship
because of medical costs during this time. They alleged a violation of
their Fifth Amendment due process rights and sued the officials seeking
a Bivens remedy.45 The Court again denied the Bivens remedy in a 6–3
decision and applied the special-factors-counseling-hesitation prong. The
Court reasoned that because Congress had enacted an elaborate scheme
to review wrongful denial of benefits, it would be improper for the Court
to apply a non-statutory remedy that would undercut the administrative
scheme. The Court stated, ―When the design of a Government program
suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial
mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of
its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.‖46
Two of the plaintiffs had pursued the administrative remedy and received
a back payment of the benefits that were denied to them. The Court also
found that the ―Bivens remedy would obviously offer the prospect of
relief for injuries that must now go unredressed,‖47 but even though the
administrative remedies provided for by Congress were not as effective
as a Bivens remedy, Bivens still could not be applied. Thus, under the
Court‘s analysis in Chilicky, to preclude a Bivens remedy, Congress must
have provided some sort of remedy that Congress found adequate. The
Court did not discuss, however, how meaningful or adequate the remedy
needed to be to preclude a Bivens action.
The most recent case before Wilkie to discuss the availability of a
Bivens action came in Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko,48 where
the Supreme Court refused to apply a Bivens action against a private
corporation operating a halfway house as a governmental contractor with

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 378.
487 U.S. 412 (1988).
Id. at 416.
Id.
Id. at 423.
Id. at 425.
534 U.S. 61 (2001).

126

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 23

the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The Court had previously held in FDIC v.
Meyer49 that Bivens actions could not be extended to suing federal
agencies instead of individual officers. Similarly, in Malesko, the Court
found that a Bivens action could not be applied to private corporations
acting under a contract with a federal agency.50 The Court stated that
alternative remedies were available, such as the ability to sue the
corporation under state tort law.51 Thus, the progeny of Bivens has shown
a general retrenchment in the availability of direct damages for a
constitutional violation by federal officials. Wilkie pronounces an even
stronger statement about the difficulty of prevailing on a Bivens action.
III. WILKIE V. ROBBINS
A. Facts
In 1994, Frank Robbins purchased the High Island Ranch from
George Nelson. The High Island Ranch is a guest resort stretching across
almost forty miles of land in Hot Springs County, Wyoming.52 The land
involved in this area of Wyoming is split into parcels owned by private
individuals, the State of Wyoming, and the federal government. The
High Island Ranch is near the Rock Creek area, a remote and scenic area
of Wyoming. South Fork Owl Creek Road runs through High Island
Ranch and directly up to the upper Rock Creek area.53 Because of
pressure from environmentalists and those who enjoy the outdoors, the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) tried to obtain an easement for the
public to use this road to connect them to the Rock Creek area.54
Unbeknownst to Robbins, two months before Robbins bought the
property from Nelson, Nelson had signed a deed of easement giving the
United States the right to use and maintain the South Fork Owl Creek
Road. In return for this easement, Nelson had received a right-of-way on
a different portion of the road to access parts of the ranch.55
Unfortunately, the government neglected to record this easement and
according to Wyoming law, when Robbins recorded his title to the ranch
in May, he took ownership of the ranch free of the easement.56 In June, a
BLM official realized the mistake had been made and immediately
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

510 U.S. 471, 473 (1994).
Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71.
Id. at 72–74.
Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2592–93.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.; see WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-1-120 (2005).
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demanded that Robbins give the United States the easement. Allegedly,
the federal officer told Robbins that ―‗the Federal Government does not
negotiate‘‖ when Robbins asked what the government would exchange
for the easement. 57 Discussion between the two parties broke down, and
as Justice Ginsburg describes in her dissent, ―the BLM officials mounted
a seven-year campaign of relentless harassment and intimidation to force
Robbins to give in.‖58
BLM officials trespassed on Robbins‘s land to survey the easement,
federal officers were told to follow possible permit violations by Robbins
more closely, federal officers allegedly made disparaging remarks about
Robbins, and officials threatened to cancel the right of way negotiated by
Robbins‘s predecessor, Nelson. The federal officers later claimed that
Robbins violated various land use regulations, which Robbins denied.59
They also refused to maintain the public road that Robbins used and
fined Robbins for trespass when he fixed the road himself, canceled his
special recreational use permit and grazing privileges, and brought
criminal charges against him for impeding and interfering with a federal
employee.60 The jury acquitted Robbins in this criminal charge, and a
news article reported the jury‘s disgust with the government‘s treatment
of Robbins.61 Even after Robbins filed the 1998 lawsuit that reached the
Supreme Court in 2007, the BLM continued to deny permits, interfere
with Robbins‘s business, and even videotape female ranch guests as they
tried to find privacy.62 In sum, the Court sifted the difficulties Robbins
endured at the hands of the BLM into four separate categories: tort-like
injuries, charges brought against him, unfavorable agency actions, and
miscellaneous offensive behavior.63
B. Procedural History
Robbins brought the lawsuit in 1998 asking for compensatory and
punitive damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief founded on
a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim and
a Bivens claim.64 Under the Bivens claim, Robbins asserted that the BLM
had violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The district court
57. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2593 (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 5, Wilkie v. Robbins, 127
S. Ct. 2588, No. 06-219 (Feb. 20, 2007)).
58. Id. at 2608 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59. Id. at 2494–95 (majority opinion).
60. Id. at 2495.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 2610.
63. Id. at 2598.
64. Id. at 2596.
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dismissed Robbins‘s claims.65 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded, specifying that the Bivens action was only
available against individual federal officials for constitutional
violations.66
On remand, the district court dismissed the Bivens Fourth
Amendment claim for malicious prosecution and the Fifth Amendment
claim for due process violations, but did not dismiss the Fifth
Amendment claim of the government‘s retaliation against Robbins. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court, holding
that Robbins had a right under the Fifth Amendment to be free from
retaliation for his refusal to give the government an easement.67 The
Court of Appeals allowed Robbins‘s allegations regarding the individual
actions of the officials to proceed under Bivens. The Court of Appeals
also allowed the RICO claim to go forward. The Supreme Court reversed
the Court of Appeals‘ grant of the Bivens action in a 7–2 vote and
unanimously reversed the Court of Appeals‘ decision to allow the RICO
claim to go forward.68 Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to Robbins, the Court maintained that the lower court should have
granted the government its motion for summary judgment by denying the
Bivens action.69 Ultimately, Robbins was left without a remedy under
either claim.
C. The Court’s Analysis
The Court not only affirmed the power of courts to recognize Bivens
actions but also recognized that a Bivens remedy is not an entitlement
after a constitutional violation. The Court held that it must follow a
―familiar sequence‖70 and used a two-part test to determine whether a
Bivens action was justified:
[T]here is the question whether any alternative, existing process for
protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial
Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in
damages. But even in the absence of an alternative, a Bivens remedy is
a subject of judgment: the federal courts must make the kind of
remedial determination that is appropriate for a common-law tribunal,

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2596–97.
Id. at 2597 (Ginsburg, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 2594 n.2; see also id. at 2597 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2598.
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paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counselling [sic]
71
hesitation before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.

The Court then analyzed the remedies available to Robbins for each
category of wrongs he asserted against BLM. For the trespass, the Court
concluded that even though he chose not to pursue the available tort
remedies, they were available.72 The administrative charges against
Robbins also had avenues for review.73 The Court recognized that
Robbins did contest various citations and had a jury hear the criminal suit
against him. The Court found, ―For each charge . . . Robbins had some
procedure to defend and make good on his position. He took advantage
of some opportunities, and let others pass; although he had mixed
success, he had the means to be heard.‖74 The Court reasoned that among
the government‘s numerous questionable activities, the videotaping of
ranch guests was ―while no doubt thoroughly irritating and bad for
business, may not have been unlawful . . . .‖75 Because this and other
activities may have been legal, no remedy at law needed to exist. The
Court concluded that Robbins did have an avenue for review or an
alternative remedy for nearly every claim. The Court, however, did not
find the existence of an alternative remedy determinative of whether a
Bivens action was available because the remedy mechanisms were
piecemeal and not elaborately established by Congress.76
The Court then continued to the second prong of determining
whether a Bivens action should apply by ―weighing reasons for and
against the creation of a new cause of action . . . .‖77 The Court seemed to
empathize with Robbins‘s argument that not one incident with the BLM
alone justifies the Bivens actions, but taken together the incidents need
some sort of remedy, or ―death by a thousand cuts‖ would result.78 The
Court, however, also recognized that the BLM officials may just have
been working with ―legitimate zeal‖ or ―hard bargaining‖ on behalf of
the public to obtain an easement for the use of all to access Rock Creek.79
The Court regarded Robbins‘s claims not as alleging that the BLM went
too far to obtain an easement, but obtaining an easement is itself a lawful
71. Id. at 2598 (citing Bush, 462 U.S. 367 at 378).
72. Id. at 2598.
73. Id. at 2597–99.
74. Id. at 2599.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2600.
77. Id.
78. Id. (quoting Brief for the Respondent at 40, Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, No. 06219 (Feb. 20, 2007).
79. Id.
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action. The Court concluded that since this was a retaliation case to
establish a denial of due process claim, Robbins would need to show that
the officers did not have a valid purpose. The Court saw obtaining an
easement as a valid purpose and characterized the BLM‘s actions as
―bargain[ing] hard by capitalizing on their discretionary authority and
Robbins‘s violations of various permit terms, though truculence was
apparent on both sides.‖80
As the Court weighed the factors counseling hesitation, two main
factors seemed to sway the Court‘s decision to deny the Bivens remedy.
First, the Court recognized that opening a Bivens claim in a retaliation
case would open the possibility for a flood of litigation. The Court stated
that opening retaliation cases to Bivens actions ―would invite claims in
every sphere of legitimate governmental action affecting property
interests, from negotiating tax claim settlements to enforcing
Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations.‖81 The
second factor the Court stated that dissuaded it from applying Bivens is
the difficulty of the constitutional inquiry. The Court stated,
The proposal . . . to create a new Bivens remedy to redress such injuries
collectively on a theory of retaliation for exercising his property right to
exclude, or on a general theory of unjustifiably burdening his rights . . .
raises a serious difficulty of devising a workable cause of action. A
judicial standard to identify illegitimate pressure going beyond
legitimately hard bargaining would be endlessly knotty to work
82
out . . . .

Accordingly, the court deemed these factors ample reason to deny
Robbins the Bivens remedy while shifting the burden of deciding Bivens
availability onto Congress.83 The Court next addressed the RICO claim
and denied Robbins a remedy under the federal statutory claim as well.84
Justice Ginsburg was joined by Justice Stevens in her dissenting
opinion that Robbins should have been afforded a Bivens remedy. The
dissent argued that that the truest intent of Bivens would be to grant such
a remedy because Robbins has no alternative remedy for ―the relentless
torment he alleges‖ at the hands of the federal BLM officers.85 Justice
Ginsburg saw the harassment as more severe than the majority saw it,

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 2604.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2604–05.
Id. at 2608.
Id. at 2613 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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and she did not believe that the campaign against Robbins could just be
dismissed as hard bargaining. Justice Ginsburg also asserted that the
majority‘s analysis that retaliation claims would open difficult
constitutional questions and the floodgate to federal court legislation
does not provide strong enough reasons to refuse to enforce a
constitutional right.86 Justice Ginsburg concluded that ―where a plaintiff
could prove a pattern of severe and pervasive harassment in duration and
degree well beyond the ordinary rough-and-tumble one expects in
strenuous negotiations, a Bivens suit would provide a remedy. Robbins
would have no trouble meeting that standard.‖87
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE STATE OF BIVENS TODAY
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the existence and availability of
the Bivens remedy when federal officers have violated an individual‘s
constitutional rights.88 In all but two of the Court‘s cases since Bivens,
however, the Court has refused to apply a Bivens action.89 Although it is
possible for an individual to assert a Bivens claim and receive damages
for a violation of one of his or her constitutional rights by a federal
officer, in practice the Court has narrowed the availability of the remedy
to few circumstances. In Wilkie, Justices Thomas and Scalia in a
concurring opinion asserted what they asserted in the 2001 Malesko case:
that Bivens should be limited to its facts, and that it is a ―relic of the
heady days in which this Court assumed common-law powers to create
causes of action.‖90 Although the Supreme Court had not affirmed a
Bivens action since Carlson v. Green in 1980, the lower courts continued
to apply Bivens.91 For example, the Tenth Circuit in Wilkie v. Robbins
found that Robbins‘s Bivens claim could go forward.92 But in each case
asserting a Bivens action, the Supreme Court has narrowed its
86. Id.
87. Id. at 2616–17.
88. See Malesko, 534 U.S. at 66 (―Our authority to imply a new constitutional tort, not
expressly authorized by statute, is anchored in our general jurisdiction to decide all cases ‗arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.‘‖) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §1331); Wilkie,
127 S. Ct. at 2597 (―[W]e have recognized two more nonstautory damages remedies . . . but we have
also held that any freestanding damages remedy for a claimed constitutional violation has to
represent a judgment about the best way to implement a constitutional
guarantee . . . .‖).
89. See Davis v. Passman, 441 U.S. 228 (1979); see also Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14
(1980).
90. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2608 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Malesko, 534 U.S. at 75
(Scalia, J., concurring)).
91. Shepardizing Bivens reveals that lower courts have followed the Bivens analysis in 576
cases and distinguished the analysis in 325 cases.
92. 433 F.3d 755, 764–65 (10th Cir. 2006).
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availability.93 Under the auspices of using the Bivens exceptions of an
alternative remedy or special factors counseling hesitation, the Court has
allowed the exceptions to swallow the rule. A grant of Bivens damages is
more or less the exception to the rule today, especially after Wilkie.
Bivens has effectively been limited to its facts and after Wilkie is very
close to a complete demise. Lower courts will no longer be able to apply
a Bivens remedy for constitutional wrongs.
Wilkie improperly limits the Bivens remedy in four ways. First,
Wilkie strengthens a lower court‘s ability to refuse Bivens actions by
lessening the requirements for an alternative remedy because the Court
admits that Robbins does not have an adequate means to receive a
remedy for the various incidents of harassment that he has endured.94
Even without a meaningful remedy, the Court still denies Robbins the
Bivens cause of action, which effectively eliminates the original purpose
of Bivens. Second, the court applies a liberal construction of what
qualifies as a special factor counseling hesitation. By basing these factors
on a floodgate analysis and the difficulty of constitutional review, instead
of the traditional avoidance with military affairs or congressional
legislation, the factors counseling hesitation can be much broader to deny
a Bivens cause of action.95 It leaves one to wonder what might be a factor
that does not counsel hesitation in applying a private right of action
against a federal officer. Third, the Court improperly declines to decide
whether a constitutional right was in fact violated before deciding how
the severity of the violation of the right affects the plaintiff‘s receipt of
damages. Lastly, the Court improperly places its focus in denying the
Bivens remedy on concerns about legislating; but in doing so the Court
shows the legislative nature of the Bivens remedy as a matter of federal
common law. In essence, the Court is doing lip service to Justice
Brennan‘s initial approach in the Bivens majority, but applying more of a
Harlan approach in actually deciding the Bivens applicability by
balancing policy considerations with the severity of the right involved.
A. Alternative Remedies No Longer Need to be Adequate or Exist
The Court in Wilkie makes a somewhat surprising turn in that it
recognizes that an adequate alternative does not exist for Robbins, but
that his availability to receive the Bivens remedy is still precluded. In
93. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Bivens, Chilicky, and Constitutional Damages Claims, 75 VA.
L. REV 1117 (1989); see also Joan Steinman, Backing off Bivens and the Ramifications of This
Retreat for the Vindication of First Amendment Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 269 (1984).
94. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2600.
95. Id. at 2604.
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Justice Harlan‘s concurrence creating the original Bivens action, it
seemed clear that the fact that Bivens had no other alternative remedies
necessitated some kind of remedy for a violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights.96 In Wilkie, however, the Court does not seemed
overly concerned with the fact that no other adequate remedy exists for
the onslaught of harassment Robbins has received at the hands of
overzealous BLM officers. The existence of an alternative remedy had
always been part of the Court‘s decision to deny a Bivens remedy in the
past.97 In fact, in the Court‘s language allowing the Bivens remedy was
the assumption unless an alternative remedy existed.98 Wilkie allows
federal courts to deny a Bivens remedy even if no other remedy exists,
and in doing so eliminates the original purpose of the Bivens remedy—to
provide a remedy for a violation of a constitutional right by federal
officers.
The Court has embraced what Gene Nichol argued was the heart of
Chief Justice Rehnquist‘s dissent in Carlson v. Green. Nichol argued that
the Chief Justice‘s dissent focused on the assumption that ―a damages
remedy is somehow a different or inappropriate method of constitutional
enforcement compared to other accepted remedies.‖99 This idea also
stems from the fact that there is a huge debate as to the role of the
Constitution in judicial enforceability. The decision in Wilkie alludes to
the argument that it is improper for the courts to remedy a constitutional
violation by a federal officer if there is any other possible remedy
available. It does not look to the meaningfulness of that remedy.
Oddly, the Court was very concerned with the kinds of remedies that
were available to Robbins.100 In the end, the fact that no remedy existed
for Robbins did not automatically ensure that Robbins would receive the
Bivens remedy. In oral arguments, the first questions several justices
asked the attorney representing the BLM were about what remedies were
96. Bivens, 403 U.S. 388, 409–410 (Harlan, J., concurring).
97. See Chappell, 462 U.S. 296 (finding that the plaintiff had an alternative remedy in
seeking review in the military system); Bush, 462 U.S. 367 (finding that the federal employment
system had an elaborate, congressionally created review system for remediating wrongful
termination); Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (finding that the plaintiff had an alternative remedy in the
elaborate review system established by Congress for those individuals who were wrongfully denied
their Social Security benefits); Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (finding that state tort law remedies were an
alternative remedy for the private individual who denied a prisoner access to the elevator).
98. See Bush, 462 U.S. at 378 (―In the absence of such a congressional directive, the federal
courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate . . . .). But see Steinman,
supra note 92, at 339 (―[T]he Court failed in Chappell and Bush to underscore the need for courts to
assess the constitutional adequacy of legislative remedial schemes before relying on those alternative
remedies to defeat implication of a Bivens action.‖).
99. Nichol, supra note 92, at 1133. Nichol continues to argue that ―arising under‖ jurisdiction
gives the Court the power to declare damage remedies and not just equitable relief. Id.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 72–75.
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available to Robbins.101 In the majority opinion, the Court noted all of the
administrative and judicial remedies that were available to Robbins. In
Chilicky, the Court declined to provide a Bivens remedy because of an
elaborate remedial scheme provided for by Congress. In Wilkie, because
of the nature of the repeated offenses and harassment, one elaborate
remedial scheme was not available. A Bivens cause of action would have
provided a federal common law remedial scheme for the violations of
Robbins‘ rights by federal officers. Because the repeated attempts at
obtaining a remedy for individual offenses by the BLM officers failed,
there was only one remedy for all of the wrongs committed against
Robbins—a Bivens award of monetary damages. In a very real way, for
Robbins it was damages or nothing. He ended up with nothing. Even
though the Court was concerned with the remedies available, the
majority erred by eliminating the importance of the availability of
another remedy in the analysis of whether Bivens would apply.
The majority articulates a test which examines whether there are
―any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a
convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a . . .
remedy in damages.‖102 The Court classifies the actions against Robbins
as ―irritating,‖ but finds the administrative and alternative judicial
process of state tort law to be available even though the Court agrees that
there are aggregate claims for relief from a ―period of six years, by a
series of public officials bent on making life difficult.‖103 The Court finds
that ―It would be hard to infer that Congress expected the Judiciary to
stay its Bivens hand [in this situation], but equally hard to extract any
clear lesson that Bivens ought to spawn a new claim.‖104 Thus, because
the Court was not convinced that the judicial branch should refrain from
applying its own remedy in light of the existing process, the Court should
101. Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588 (No. 06-219).
Justice Ginsburg asked:
[T]here‘s a record here that the district court said there was substantial evidence, enough
to go to trial, of a pattern of harassing conduct that included trespasses on this man‘s
lodge and leaving the place in disarray, videotaping the guests, selective enforcement of
the grazing laws, a whole pattern of things, even asking the Bureau of Indian Affairs to
impound his cattle? This man says, this has been done to me by officers of my
government. Is there a remedy?‖
Id. at 8 (Justice Scalia asked: ―[T]he photographing of his guests who he brings onto his ranch to
hunt and they pay him for that. And then he claims that the BLM follows them just to harass them,
just taking photographs. What relief could he get for that?‖); id. at 10 (Justice Kennedy asked: ―Does
he have any action that is other than piecemeal?‖).
102. Wilkie, 127 St. Ct. at 2598 (emphasis added).
103. Id. at 2600–01.
104. Id. at 2600.
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have applied the Bivens remedy. Instead, the Court reasoned that the
decision would be too difficult if it looked at the remedy alone. This
decision is a departure from previous jurisprudence where the
presumption rested in favor of granting a Bivens action.
The Court departs even further from established precedent and
narrows the availability of Bivens when it states, ―But even in the
absence of an alternative, a Bivens remedy is a subject of judgment.‖105
Even though in previous cases some sort of an alternative was always
available when the Court denied a remedy, in Wilkie no alternative
remedy even has to exist.106 The deterioration first from the Bivens
remedy to a less effective congressionally stated remedy, and then
removing the alternative remedy requirement altogether, shows that
Wilkie is practically limiting Bivens to its facts. The Court now decides
as a matter of judgment whether the Bivens cause of action will be
available. Alternative remedies no longer play as significant a role in the
analysis of whether a Bivens remedy should be applied. Because of this,
the Court has severely diminished the ability of an individual to receive a
remedy for a violation of his or her constitutional rights by a federal
officer.
B. Widening the Special Factors Counseling Hesitation to Narrow
Bivens
The judgment that the Court appears to adopt is a balancing test
between the appropriate remedies provided at common law and whether
there are any special factors that would counsel hesitation. The historic
interest in providing monetary damages for invasions of personal liberty
was established in Bivens itself and has been long accepted as part of
administering justice.107 The special factors counseling hesitation to the
Court‘s decision to provide monetary remedies seemed in earlier cases to
be narrow and specific to the facts at hand.108 In Wilkie, however, this
test becomes more legislative than judicial in nature, because the Court
can now make policy decisions as to whether or not to apply the remedy
instead of looking solely to the remedies available and assessing whether
they are adequate. In the Bivens opinion, the dissenters argued that it was
105. Id. at 2598.
106. See supra text accompanying note 89.
107. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396.
108. For instance, in Chappell, 462 U.S. 296 (1983), the unique nature of the military regime
was a special factor counseling hesitation. In Bush, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), the federal government‘s
interest in providing an employment scheme and review of that scheme was a special factor
counseling hesitation. In Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988), Congress‘s elaborate remedial scheme for
denied Social Security benefits was a special factor counseling hesitation.
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improper for the Court to create a cause of action without express
congressional authority.109 The dissenters in Bivens have prevailed. The
majority in Wilkie argues, like the dissenters in Bivens, that the Court
should make the legislative policy decisions about whether or not to
apply the cause of action in each case, and that congressional authority is
just one factor to consider in making this judgment.110
In Wilkie, the Court stays true to the words of the Bivens majority
and its progeny as it looks to what special factors may abound that would
counsel hesitation. The Court, however, adopts a much broader view of
what these special factors could be. With such a broad view of what
factors could preclude a Bivens remedy, the Bivens remedy itself
becomes almost impossible to apply. The Court adopts two main policy
reasons why they should avoid granting Robbins a Bivens remedy. The
first is a fear of opening the floodgates of litigation for those seeking a
Bivens remedy. The Court explains that ―a Bivens action to redress
retaliation against those who resist Government impositions on their
property rights would invite claims in every sphere of legitimate
governmental action affecting property interests . . . .‖111 The floodgates
argument is a common concern in federal litigation, but it has not been
considered a special factor in previous Bivens actions. In her dissent,
Justice Ginsburg discusses this departure from precedent when she states,
―The Court finds . . . a special factor counseling hesitation quite unlike
any we have recognized before.‖112 If the Court takes this to its logical
extension in future cases, then to apply a Bivens remedy to any
constitutional violation other than one the Court has already declared
deserving of the same would open the floodgates to litigation and would
be barred under this prong of the test. This is not a persuasive special
factor that should preclude the Court from using its historic power to
grant a remedy for a violation of a right.113
The second factor that the Court reasons should preclude the
application of a Bivens remedy is the difficulty of determining whether
Robbins‘s constitutional rights have been violated by the federal officers.
This factor bleeds into the floodgates argument because the vagueness of

109. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2604–05.
110. See id. at 2598. (―But even in the absence of an alternative, a Bivens remedy is a subject
of judgment: ‗the federal courts must make the kind of remedial determination that is appropriate for
a common law tribunal, paying particular heed, however, to any special factors counseling hesitation
before authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.‘‖) (quoting Bush, 462 U.S. 367 at 378).
111. Id. at 2603.
112. Id. at 2613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
113. See George D. Brown, Letting Statutory Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs—Have the
Bivens Dissenters Prevailed? 64 IND. L. J. 263, 294 (1989) (contending that ―[s]pecial factors should
be special, as opposed to generally present.‖).
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the constitutional right, the Court believes, would encourage many to
respond with a Bivens action when they feel the federal government has
gone too far in negotiations.114 The Court explains, ―A judicial standard
to identify illegitimate pressure going beyond legitimately hard
bargaining would be endlessly knotty to work out . . . .‖115 The Court
shies away from making this determination by reasoning that the
difficulty of inquiry is a factor in and of itself that counsels hesitation.
This is an insufficient policy reason on which to base the denial of a
Bivens remedy. Most cases that come before the Supreme Court have
difficult constitutional questions to resolve. The difficulty in this case of
deciding whether the retaliatory acts by the federal officers violated
constitutional rights strikes at the very purpose for why we have a
Supreme Court. Surely difficult inquiries can be said to appear in any
case that reaches a court, especially those cases attempting to assert a
Bivens cause of action. This circular reasoning for denying a Bivens
remedy does not amount to a special factor counseling hesitation. The
Court could avoid applying the Bivens remedy by simply finding the
constitutional violation too difficult of an inquiry. Like the floodgates
argument, the difficulty of inquiry argument allows the Court to preclude
a Bivens remedy in almost any situation, if followed to the logical
extreme. In essence, the special factors are no longer very special, but the
test has turned into more of an any factors counseling hesitation
balancing test.
C. The Severity of the Right Infringed
The broad policy reasons that the Court adopts in refusing a Bivens
remedy mask the true reason for the Court‘s refusal—the lack of severity
of a violation of the constitutional right. The Court infers that the
infringement, if any, of constitutional rights was not severe enough to
warrant the creation of a new cause of action. The Court is sympathetic
to Robbins‘s plight, but not enough to allow a remedy. The Court
classifies the violations as irritating—maybe even lawful—forms of
―hard bargaining.‖116 In a case without a clear violation of a clear
constitutional right, the Court is even more reluctant to provide a Bivens
remedy even though there is no alternative remedy and no traditional
special factors like a congressional remedial scheme already mandated or
military procedures.

114. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2604.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2599–2600.
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In the original Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents case, the
plaintiff was a man who was woken up in the middle of the night by
armed federal officers, dragged out of bed, forced to stand naked in his
living room, and then brought into jail without a probable cause and with
excessive force.117 This was a well-defined violation of the plaintiff‘s
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure
by federal officers. In Wilkie, it is much less clear whether the federal
officer‘s harassment of Robbins constituted a violation of a precise
constitutional right. The dissent disagrees with the majority on the
severity of the right at issue. Justice Ginsburg argues that because there
is not a congressional scheme or any of the traditional special factors
counseling hesitation, Robbins should have a right to recover damages
because he has been a victim of a constitutional violation by a federal
agent.118
The Court concludes that
There is a world of difference between a popular Bivens remedy for a
well-defined violation [and] litigation invited because the elements of a
claim are so unclear that no one can tell in advance what claim might
qualify or what might not. . . .119 The point here is not to deny that
Government employees sometimes overreach, for of course they
do . . . . The point is the reasonable fear that a general Bivens cure
120
would be worse than the disease.

The Court obviously fears expanding Bivens more than is necessary,
which could be a valid concern. With the dearth of actual Supreme Court
opinions upholding the Bivens remedy, this fear is somewhat
unjustified.121 The Court uses the floodgates arguments discussed above
not to limit the Bivens action from expanding to include severe
infringements of constitutional rights, but rather to limit infringements of
rights that the Court determines are inconsequential.
This discrimination between severe and less severe constitutional
infringements in deciding whether a Bivens remedy should be applied is
not sound because it begs the question of what infringements of rights
are severe enough to be receive a Bivens remedy and because it causes

117. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
118. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 2604 n.11 (responding to Justice Ginsburg‘s criticism of the floodgates factor that
the Court uses to deny the Bivens remedy).
120. Id. at 2604.
121. See supra Part II (discussing the general retrenchment of the availability of the Bivens
action).
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the Court to again draw vague lines. If federal officers violate an
individual‘s constitutional right, the Court should apply a Bivens remedy.
The Court should take into account the severity of the violation in
determining damages for the violation, not in determining whether the
remedy should be applied at all.
It is troubling that the Court never reaches a consensus as to whether
Robbins in actuality suffered a violation of his constitutional rights.
Without such a consensus, the Court‘s reasoning is circular and denies a
Bivens remedy prematurely. If Robbins did suffer a violation of a
constitutional right, the fact that it is a difficult question because it is not
a severe violation precludes the ability of Bivens to apply for fear of an
onslaught of Bivens actions. If he did not suffer a constitutional violation,
then a Bivens remedy does not need to be applied in the first place. The
Court puts the proverbial cart before the horse by inferring that the right
violated is not severe enough to warrant a Bivens remedy before
determining whether the right was violated at all. The Court‘s analysis
begs the question of what constitutional infringements by a federal
officer are severe enough to warrant a Bivens remedy. If the BLM
officers had seized Robbins‘s land without compensation, would the
Court be more willing to grant Robbins a cause of action to seek
damages for a direct constitutional violation? What if the BLM officers
had only seized an inconsequential portion of Robbins‘s land? The
Court‘s confusing dichotomy of whether the right was infringed and
whether the right was severe enough to warrant a Bivens action results in
another illogical limit on Bivens. The Court should have clearly
determined whether the actions by the BLM agents warranted a remedy
at all.
D. The Court’s Legislative Consideration
The Court in Wilkie acts more like a legislature in considering
whether a Bivens action should apply by weighing and balancing many
factors: the existence of an alternative remedy, special factors counseling
hesitation, and the severity of the right infringed. After deciding against
applying a Bivens remedy, the Court states that Congress should be the
one to provide a remedy. The Court states: ―We think accordingly that
any damages remedy for actions by Government employees who push
too hard for the Government‘s benefit may come better, if at all, through
legislation.‖122 This hope by a strong majority of the Court is far flung.
The Court exists to remedy violations of individual rights and, I argue,

122. Wilkie, 127 S. Ct. at 2604–05.
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has the power to do so directly from the Constitution itself.123 The power
of the Bivens cause of action is to provide a remedy for isolated abuses of
power by federal officers, abuses that directly violate an individual‘s
constitutional rights. Deferring to Congress to provide for a cause of
action against federal officers who push too hard in this case is not a
practical solution, nor is it needed. The Court has the power to apply a
remedy for a constitutional violation by a federal officer. The Court has
chosen to punt this responsibility to Congress and in doing so leaves
individuals without protection against abuses by federal officers.
Even as the majority of the Court argues that determining a remedy
in this case is a task for the legislative branch, the Court acts much like a
legislature in reaching that decision. The Court suggests that future
decisions as to availability of Bivens remedies can be determined through
a case-by-case balancing approach, which mirrors Justice Harlan‘s
original dissent in Bivens. Instead of looking to alternative remedies as
the main factor, however, the Court‘s current balancing approach looks
to the possibility of opening the floodgates and the difficulty of
determining the constitutional right.124 Because the Court acts more like
a legislature in considering these factors, the Court is able to choose
which factors it finds more important than the other factors. In doing so,
the Court has veered from the original and most important consideration
in the Bivens analysis—whether an alternative remedy exists. However,
the Court, not Congress, created the Bivens remedy, and it is in the
province of the Court to adapt and change the remedy as it sees fit. In
changing the importance of the factors, the Court has veered from the
original purpose of a Bivens action—to remedy a constitutional violation
by a federal officer.
V. CONCLUSION
Wilkie improperly restricts the Bivens action. Not every right
deserves a remedy, but when a remedy is readily available and the only
considerations that preclude the remedy from being granted are concerns
that too many cases seeking a similar remedy for a redress of wrongs,
and the difficulty of deciding whether a right was really violated, the
remedy should be granted. Robbins is left without a remedy for the
123. The validity of the Bivens action itself is much debated. Discussing at length the
theoretical arguments for whether the Court overstepped its bounds in creating a constitutional
common law right against federal officers is beyond the scope of this Note; however, this Note
argues that the Court reaffirms its ability to do so but chooses not to use its judicial power to create
remedies for constitutional violations.
124. See Brown, supra note 102, at 298 (―the Court is moving closer and closer to treating the
availability of Bivens remedies as a legislative question.‖).
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overall harassment he received at the hands of federal officers when one
could have been easily applied. The proper role for the Court is to apply
such a remedy when it is available. Instead, the Court denies the remedy
without deciding whether the right was even violated.
The future of the Bivens remedies seems to be quite limited. Bivens
itself is good law. In a case where federal officers clearly violate the
Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff would be able to receive a Bivens remedy
of damages. The Court in Wilkie establishes that to receive a Bivens
remedy, there must be (1) no other alternative, (2) no fear that granting a
Bivens remedy will open the floodgates of litigation, and (3) a clear and
easily determined violation by the federal officer of a constitutional right.
The proper role of Congress and the courts will also be an issue in the
future Bivens actions, because even though the Court defers to Congress
in this case to establish a cause of action, the Court effectively acts like a
legislature in deciding that the traditional cause of action is not available.
In theory, Bivens remedies are still available, but in practical application,
a Bivens remedy will only be applied in rare, almost extreme
circumstances. Wilkie v. Robbins shows that when it comes to federal
officers violating constitutional rights, there might not be a remedy for
every right—no matter how easy and obvious continued recognition of
an adequate judicial remedy might seem.
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